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I. INTRODUCTION
A majority of states, including Washington and New York, have
statutes that prohibit aiding suicide.1 These statutes are understood
to prohibit physicians from assisting their mentally competent,
terminally-ill patients to hasten death. The assisted suicide statutes in
Washington and New York have recently been challenged in federal
court under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion.' In Compassion in Dying v. Washington,3 the court granted
1. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(2) (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(AX3) (1989);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(aX2) (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-104(lXb) (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56(a)(2) (West
1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1992);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-31 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-
2.5 (Bums 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204
(West 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215
(West Supp. 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1992);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-307 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-6 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.30,
125.15(3) (McKinney 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 813-818 (West 1983); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.125(lXb) (1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2505 (1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1-10 (Law.
Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37 (Law. Co-op. 1988); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.08 (West 1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.12
(West 1982).
2. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for rehearing en bancftled March 22, 1995; Quill v. Koppel, 870
F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting state's motion to dismiss; holding that physician assisted
death is not constitutionally protected), appeal docketed, No. 95-7028 (2d Cir. 1995).
3. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for
rehearing en banc filed March 22, 1995.
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summary judgment to the plaintiffs and held that competent, terminal-
ly-ill patients have a constitutionally protected right to choose to hasten
death with physician assistance and that Washington's assisted suicide
statute is unconstitutional under both the Liberty and Equal Protection
Clauses of the 14th Amendment.4
Until November 1994, legislative efforts to establish the right to
physician aid in dying had not succeeded. A number of states,
including Washington (in 1991)' and California (in 1992),6 consid-
ered, but narrowly failed to approve, initiative measures permitting
physician aid in dying. Oregon passed such a measure in November
1994.' A lawsuit attempting to prohibit the Oregon law from taking
effect was immediately filed by anti-choice activists.' Several states
have appointed "Blue Ribbon" task forces to analyze the issue and
make recommendations to the state legislatures. The task forces have
split on the issue: New York's recommended against legislative
reform; Michigan's favored legislative reform.9
Michigan State courts have confronted similar issues in various
challenges to Michigan laws prohibiting assisted suicide. In December
1994, the highest Michigan State court ruled that the federal constitu-
tion provides no right to physician-assisted death.1"
Plaintiffs in these cases maintain that the United States Constitu-
tion protects the right of a mentally competent, terminally-ill person
to choose to hasten his or her death in a manner that is sure to result
in death, is nonviolent, and preserves dignity by self-administering
drugs prescribed by a doctor for that purpose." This Article presents
4. Id.
5. See Beverly Merz, Despite Defeat of State's Suicide Initiative, Issue Still Unsettled:
Washington State Vote on Physician-Assisted Suicide, AM. MED. NEWS, November 18, 1991, at 1.
6. See Lou Cannon et al., The 1992 Elections: State By State; The Pacifi, WASH. POST,
November 5, 1992, at A41.
7. See The Oregon Death with Dignity Act (1994), reprinted in Kane v. Kulongaski, 871
P.2d 993, 1001-06 (Or. 1994); Diane M. Gianelli, Assisted-Suicide Measure Fails in New Mexico;
AMA Opposed It, AM. MED. NEWS, March 20, 1995, at 3.
8. Lee v. Oregon, 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Or. 1994).
9. See Ronald Sullivan, Suit Challenges New York's Law Banning Doctor-Assisted Suicide,
N.Y. TIMES. July 22, 1994, at B2; Edward Walsh, Michigan Commission Favors Legal Physician-
Assisted Suicide, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1994, at A14.
10. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994) (deciding several cases relating to
assisted suicide), cert. denied sub nor., Hobbins v. Kelley, 131 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1995). The
Michigan cases assert only a federal constitutional liberty claim; they do not assert an equal
protection claim. Id.
11. The need for physician involvement is most readily apparent to the medically and/or
pharmacologically educated. Terminally-ill persons are generally consuming a variety of drugs
to manage their condition. Determining the correct drug(s) to effect a humane death, and the
amount and manner of consumption, is a complex medical pharmacological task. See RUSSEL D.
1995]
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the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual
decision to hasten death with physician-prescribed medication and that
statutes prohibiting physician-assisted suicide deny equal protection,
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, to competent, terminally-ill
adults who are not on life support.
II. SUMMARY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects Individual Liberty
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty extends to important
personal decisions that individuals make about their lives and how they
will live them. 2  The challenged statutes, 13 which make aiding a
suicide a criminal act, prevent mentally competent, dying citizens from
choosing to shorten the period of suffering before death by self-
administering drugs prescribed for the purpose of hastening death.
The state thus intrudes into and controls a profoundly and uniquely
personal decision, one that is properly reserved to the individual, to be
made in consultation with his or her doctor. These statutes thereby
abridge the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment Guarantees Equal Protection
A somewhat unusual aspect of the challenged laws is that they do
not seek to punish suicide, or attempted suicide, itself; citizens have the
right to refuse, or direct the withdrawal of, life-sustaining treatment
with the intent to hasten death. 4 Physicians who comply with such
requests are immune from prosecution under- the challenged statutes."
Some terminally-ill patients, thus, are able to choose to hasten their
OGDEN, EUTHANASIA, ASSISTED SUICIDE AND AIDS 89 (1994). Physicians' attitudes about
assisting death have been surveyed in some states. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Cohen et al., Attitudes
Toward Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia Among Physicians in Washington State, 331 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 89, 90-91 (1994) (reflecting that fifty-three percent of Washington physicians support
the legalization of assisted suicide).
12. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child rearing and education); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261 (1990) (refusing unwanted medical treatment).
13. For examples of various state statutes dealing with physician-assisted suicide, see supra
note 1.
14. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1994) (punishing a person for aiding another
in the attempt of suicide).
15. See, e.g., id. § 70.122.100 (prohibiting mercy-killing but allowing one to "permit the
natural process of dying").
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inevitable deaths with medical assistance. This distinction, between a
terminally-ill patient whose condition involves life-sustaining treatment
and a dying patient whose condition does not involve life-sustaining
treatment, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects the Right of Competent,
Terminally-Ill Adults to Choose to Hasten Inevitable Death With
Physician-Prescribed Medications
1. Competent, Terminally-Ill Adults Have a Liberty Interest
in Making End-of-Life-Decisions Free of Undue
Government Interference
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that the State may not
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."' 16  In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,17 the Supreme Court
recognized:
the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.
Before viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to
support prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial
obstacle to the woman's effective right to elect the procedure."8
The Court stated:
Constitutional protection of the woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It declares that no State shall "deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The
controlling word in the case before us is "liberty."19
Casey reiterated that the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause encompasses more than the rights guaranteed by the express
provisions of the first eight amendments.20 Casey stated resounding-
ly: "It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter."'21
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
17. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), affg Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. Id. at 2804.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2805.
21. Id.
1995]
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Plaintiffs challenging assisted suicide statutes assert that end-of-
life decisions for competent, terminally-ill adults occur within that
realm.2  The district court in Washington agreed.23  The district
court in New York rejected this argument 4
Casey recognizes that "[o]ur law affords constitutional protection
to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education."25  Casey noted
that, "[i]t is settled now, as it was when the Court heard arguments in
Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to
interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and
parenthood, as well as bodily integrity. ' 26 The protection of basic
personal decisions from state intrusion limits the state's power to
interfere with end-of-life decision-making, the doctor-patient relation-
ship, and the joint selection and implementation of appropriate
treatment.
No sound reason exists for excluding end-of-life decisions from
the scope of the protection defined by Casey. Indeed, the Court's
discussion of why decisions in these situations are protected applies
with full force to end-of-life decisions:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
22. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 788, 795
(1989). Rubenfeld reasons that the right to privacy should be found to apply where the
challenged law would subject the person claiming the right to "totalitarian burdens" in his or her
daily life. Id. at 788. In the case of terminally-ill persons seeking to hasten inevitable death,
"being forced to live is in fact to be forced into a particular, all consuming, totally dependent and
indeed rigidly standardized life .... It is a life almost totally occupied." Id. at 795. Thus, a
right of liberty or privacy must protect the decision of a competent, terminally-ill adult to hasten
inevitable death. The statute is defective under either a recognition of a sphere of personal
decision-making safe from government intrusion or a recognition that laws that operate to"occupy" lives or confine them into a painful and dependent condition are invalid.
23. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1460.
24. Quill v. Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), appeal docketed, No. 95-7028
(2d Cir. 1995).
The court in Quill held that plaintiffs' reading of the reproductive rights cases was "too
broad." The court, finding no historical support for assisted suicide, held that no guaranteed right
existed. Id. at 83-84. The court fundamentally misunderstood the conduct at issue, describing
it as "self destruction." Id. at 84 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5(2), cmt. 100 (1980), which
refers to assisted suicide as "self-destruction").
Certainly the state has a legitimate interest in preventing "self destruction;" however, the
destruction of life at issue in these cases is wrought by disease. The choice to hasten death and
exit life in a humane fashion cannot properly be characterized as "self destruction."
25. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
26. Id. at 2806 (citations omitted).
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concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life.27
As noted in Casey, "[b]eliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State."28  Further, Casey recognizes that where the suffering of an
individual is involved, a state's ability to insist that the individual
endure the suffering is limited.2 9
Recognizing the right of competent, terminally-ill persons to
hasten death unquestionably raises religious implications. These same
implications are raised by the right to abortion; yet, as recognized by
Casey, "that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define
the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. The underlying
constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic
questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the
matter . "..."30
In the case of dying, competent patients, the question is whether
a state can resolve the philosophical questions relating to the end of life
in such a definitive way that competent, terminally-ill adults lack all
choice in the matter. The answer, consistent with Casey, must be no.
To hold otherwise would necessarily mean that the State's religious or
philosophic preference outweighs the competent individual's control
over his or her own suffering and method of dying.
The Court in Casey observed the doctrinal affinity between Roe's
rule of personal autonomy and bodily integrity and cases recognizing
limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or bar its
rejection. Indeed, the Court noted that cases since Roe accord with
Roe's view that "a [s]tate's interest in the protection of life falls short
of justifying any plenary override of individual liberty claims."31
Casey permits a state to enact rules governing abortion so long as
they do not impose an undue burden on the woman's ability to make
her decision.32  An undue burden exists where regulation "has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. ' 33  The undue-
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. ("Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the state to insist, without more,
upon its own vision of the women's role ... .
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2810 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990)).
32. Id. at 2818-20.
33. Id. at 2820.
1995]
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burden/substantial-obstacle rule of Casey adequately protects any state
interests in physician-assisted death as well. 34 For example, a state's
interest in protecting against the ability of mentally-disturbed or
depressed patients to choose physician-assisted death could be
accommodated by regulation requiring a psychological evaluation of
each patient.
2. The Liberty Interest in Choosing to Hasten Inevitable Death
With Medical Assistance Is Indistinguishable from Refusing
Unwanted Medical Treatment in Order to Hasten Death
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,3" the
Supreme Court acknowledged that competent persons have the
constitutional right to direct the removal of life-sustaining medical
treatment and thus hasten death,36 and that the liberty to make this
end-of-life decision is uniquely and "deeply personal."37  Cruzan
addressed the question of the level of evidence Missouri could require
as to the wishes of a presently incompetent person that life-sustaining
treatment be withdrawn. The Court made it clear that a state's
interest in this area is in ensuring a voluntary decision, not in
interfering with one.
The dissents in Cruzan differed as to the limitations that a state
could impose to ensure voluntariness, but emphasized the personal
nature of end-of-life decisions and the limited state interest in such
decisions:
34. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1466.
35. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
36. Id. at 278 ("The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions."); see also id. at 267-68 ("All agree that such a removal [of life support] would cause
her death.").
37. Id. at 281.
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Dying is personal. And it is profound. For many, the thought of
an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, proud
death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence.
Although the right to be free of unwanted medical interven-
tion, like other constitutionally protected interests, may not be
absolute, no state interest could outweigh the rights of an individual
in Nancy Cruzan's position. Whatever a [s]tate's possible interests
in mandating life-support treatment under other circumstances,
there is no good to be obtained here by Missouri's insistence that
Nancy Cruzan remain on life-support systems if it is indeed her
wish not to do so. Missouri does not claim, nor could it, that
society as a whole would be benefited by Nancy's receiving medical
treatment.3
Justice Stevens' separate dissent states his view:
Choices about death touch the core of liberty. Our duty, and the
concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions of our
own mortality are undoubtedly "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental" ....
The more precise constitutional significance of death is difficult
to describe; not much may be said with confidence about death
unless it is said from faith, and that alone is reason enough to
protect the freedom to conform choices about death to individual
conscience.39
Where the patient is competent, as in both the Washington and
New York challenges to assisted-suicide statutes, Cruzan's recognition
of the extremely personal nature of the decision to refuse medical
treatment, even where that refusal will cause death, strongly supports
plaintiffs' position.4° Once the decision to refuse treatment and thus
hasten death is recognized as protected and uniquely personal, it cannot
reasonably be distinguished from the decision to seek medical
assistance in hastening death.4 Indeed, from the patient's perspec-
38. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 310-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1461-62. But see Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 82-83.
41. Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467. Anti-choice commentators recognize as
much: "Arguably, the distinction between passive and active euthanasia already has become
dangerously blurred, if not altogether obliterated, by court decisions that permit the removal of
feeding tubes." Thomas Mayo, Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die," 49 MD. L. REV. 103, 139
1995]
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tive, the decision to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration is different
in no material respect from the decision to choose to otherwise hasten
death. "Patients request physician-assisted suicide for the same
reasons that they refuse life-saving treatment: [T]hey want control
over when they die, where they die, and their physical and mental state
at the time of their death." 42  Thus, the constitutional principle
behind recognizing a right to refuse artificial life support applies
equally to the choice to hasten inevitable death by other means.43
Thus, forced continuation of a life ravaged by pain and suffering
for a competent, terminally-ill adult who has a voluntary and informed
desire to hasten his or her own death is a cruel and demeaning invasion
into basic rights of liberty, privacy, and self-determination.
B. The Challenged Statutes Deny Equal Protection to Competent,
Terminally-Ill Adults Who Are Not on Life Support
Even before Cruzan, both Washington and New York courts (as
have many other state courts nationwide) recognized the right of a
competent, terminally-ill adult to hasten death by directing that life-
sustaining medical treatment be suspended.44 The courts effectively
exclude from the facial coverage of the assisted suicide statutes those
who assist in such decisions.
The Washington Natural Death Act, enacted in 1979 and
amended in 1992, explicitly recognizes the patient's interest in avoiding
n.198 (1990); see also Yale Kamisar, When Is There a Constitutional "Right to Die'? When Is
There No Constitutional "Right to Live"?, 25 GA. L. REV. 1203, 1227 (1991); accord Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that starving oneself to death through refusal of life-
sustaining artificial nutrition and hydration "is no different from putting a gun to one's temple
as far as the common-law definition of suicide is concerned.").
42. Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die With Assistance, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 2021, 2026 (1992); see also Joel R. Cornwell, Wrongful Life and the Problem of Euthanasia,
23 GONZ. L. REv. 573, 583 (1988) (concluding that the distinction between "hastening death"
and "not prolonging dying" or between "killing" and "letting die" is meaningless from a volitional
standpoint); Hilary Hughes Young, Assisted Suicide and Physician Liability, 11 REv. LMG. 623,
633 (1992).
The decision to refuse treatment is seen from the medical profession's perspective as
"assisting in a patient's wish to die." See Steven I. Addlestone, Liability for Improper Maintenance
of Life Support: Balancing Patient and Physician Authority, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1255, 1262 (1993).
. 43. See Young, supra note 38, at 632-33, 638-39, 650-51. This right includes necessary
medical assistance. Medical assistance is involved when treatment is refused, for example, in
removing a feeding tube, ventilator, or dialysis machine. Similarly, medical assistance in hastening
death for persons not on life support is necessary to permit implementation of this choice. In this
case, assistance would consist of the doctor prescribing appropriate medications.
44. In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), corrected, 757
P.2d 534 (1988); In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); Grace
Plaza, Inc. v. Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d 513 (N.Y. 1993); Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y.
1990); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986).
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"loss of patient dignity, and unnecessary pain and suffering."4 The
statute protects "the fundamental right to control the decisions relating
to the rendering of [adult persons'] own health care," "individual
autonomy," and "dignity and privacy."" These interests and rights
apply equally to all terminally-ill adults. The statute, however,
specifically allows only those terminally-ill adults47 who are on life-
sustaining treatment to direct their doctors to withdraw such treat-
ment,48 and it protects such doctors from criminal prosecution.49
Thus, many states, including Washington, recognize a significant
liberty interest in the right to control the decisions relating to the
rendering of health care and then distinguish between those competent,
terminally-ill adults whose condition involves life-sustaining treatment
and those whose condition does not. The first group has the right to
direct the course of treatment with the specific purpose and result of
hastening inevitable death. The second group does not, and must
suffer the very same pain and suffering and loss of dignity and privacy
from which the statute protects the first class. As discussed above, the
decision to request termination of life-sustaining treatment is different
in no material respect from requesting other means of hastening
inevitable death. This fact, and the equal protection implications, has
been recognized:
In essence, the distinction between physician-assisted suicide and the
withdrawal or refusal of treatment is grounded in the policy-based
categorization of suicide by withdrawing treatment as legal and
suicide with physician assistance as illegal. Despite claims to the
contrary, courts created exceptions to laws against "aiding suicide"
when they permitted patients to demand withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment.50
Another commentator observed:
If the decision to live or die is said to be so fundamental to a person
that the state may not make it for him, then it is difficult to see on
what plausible ground the right to make this decision could be
45. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.010 (1994).
46. Id.
47. While excluding the terminally-ill adult whose condition does not involve life-sustaining
treatment, the statute extends its protection to a group not terminally ill: those who are
permanently unconscious. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.030 (1994).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 70.122.051 (1994).
50. Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REV.
2021, 2030 (1992).
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granted to those on life-support but denied to all other individu-
als. 51
The right of competent, terminally-ill adults to choose to hasten
inevitable death with physician-prescribed medications is a choice
protected by the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is
a fundamental right. Where government action burdens the funda-
mental rights of some more than those of others, the disparity is
subject to strict scrutiny.5 2  In Skinner v. Oklahoma,5 3 for example,
the Court recognized that personal autonomy in reproductive matters
is a fundamental right and that a law requiring sterilization of all felons
except white collar felons was subject to strict scrutiny and violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Skinner establishes that classifications that
unequally distribute access to fundamental choices are presumptively
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,54
the Court examined a state law that prohibited the sale of contracep-
tives to single persons, but granted access for married persons. The
Court found that, "[i]n each case the evil, as perceived by the State,
would be identical, and the underinclusion would be invidious.""5
Prohibiting competent, terminally-ill adults whose treatment does
not include life support from exercising the right to choose to hasten
death, a right that is recognized in Cruzan and Washington and New
York law, distributes access to this choice unequally. The choice made
by such persons to hasten inevitable death is different in no material
respect from the choice of terminally-ill persons on life support to
request its termination for the purpose of hastening death. No
compelling state interest supports such a discriminatory classifica-
tion.56
51. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 794-95 (1989).
52. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-6, 16-12 (2d ed. 1988).
53. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
54. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
55. Id. at 454.
56. The district court in Quill, having rejected the claim that a fundamental right was
involved, applied a rational basis test and upheld New York's discriminatory classification. Quill,
870 F. Supp. at 84-85.
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IV. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL RECOGNITION
OF A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO CHOOSE TO
HASTEN DEATH WITH PHYSICIAN ASSISTANCE
This Section anticipates some of the medical and legal repercus-
sions of a right to physician-assisted death. Part A of this Section
addresses the impact of physician-assisted death on physicians. Part
B anticipates the regulatory control, and limits of control, of the
practice of physician-assisted death.
A. Physicians Can Prescribe for the Purpose of Hastening Death
If a constitutionally protected right to choose to hasten death with
physician assistance is ultimately established, physicians will be able to
prescribe drugs for the purpose of hastening death to their competent,
dying patients, consistent with their professional judgment. Of course,
physicians will be responsible for assuring that such patients are
competent and acting voluntarily. In light of the severity of the result
in the event of a mistake, doctors and hospitals will need to develop
protocols to ensure that these standards are met and that the patient's
privacy is protected.
B. State Regulation of Assisted Dying
It is likely that a court recognizing the patient's right to choose to
hasten death will also recognize that the state may regulate the
practice. 7 Physicians, physician organizations, and others involved
in providing health care services can and should play an active role in
the development of regulations in this area. Clinical criteria will need
to be established."8 Regulations might require a waiting period; the
provision of information regarding alternative care options (e.g.,
hospice); a treating relationship between doctor and patient; reporting
by facilities where assistance occurs; and various other measures.
C. Challenges to State Regulation Can Be Anticipated
Regulation by the state will be subject to scrutiny under the Casey
undue burden standard. 9 It can be anticipated that regulation of this
practice will be controversial and may result in litigation challenging
57. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1466.
58. See, e.g., F. G. Miller et al., Regulating Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 119 (1994); Timothy Quill, Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical Criteria for
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380 (1992).
59. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1466.
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
the provisions, akin to the reproductive rights cases, as the issue of
what regulation is permissible (i.e., does not unduly burden) versus
what is not (i.e., constitutes an undue burden) is resolved. Interesting-
ly, it would appear that the Oregon Death with Dignity Act is
vulnerable to an undue burden challenge. That law requires, for
example, a 15-day waiting period. Such a lengthy waiting period may
well constitute an undue burden.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has recognized that the constitutional right of
liberty stands as a barrier against laws that deny individuals the right
to make the most fundamental choices affecting their values and lives.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty to choose between a
tortured, hideous death and a less painful, more dignified one, and it
protects the equality of all who seek to make that fundamental,
personal choice.
There can be little doubt that the question of whether dying
patients have a constitutionally protected right to choose to hasten
inevitable death with physician assistance will ultimately reach the
United States Supreme Court. Should that court determine that such
a right exists, the effect will be similar to that of Roe v. Wade in the
reproductive rights context. States will be permitted to regulate but
not prohibit physician-assisted death. Alternatively, if a federal
constitutional right is not recognized, litigation may move to state
courts under state constitutions, which are often more protective than
the federal constitution. Another means to afford patients the right to
choose physician-assisted death is through the legislature. Should
judicial relief prove elusive, the pressure for legislative reform will
likely increase.
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